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We study an over-the-counter (OTC) market with bilateral meetings and bargaining where the usefulness
of assets, as means of payment or collateral, is limited by the threat of fraudulent practices. We assume
that agents can produce fraudulent assets at a positive cost, which generates endogenous upper bounds
on the quantity of each asset that can be sold, or posted as collateral in the OTC market. Each endogenous,
asset-specific, resalability constraint depends on the vulnerability of the asset to fraud, on the frequency
of trade, and on the current and future prices of the asset. In equilibrium, the set of assets can be partitioned
into three liquidity tiers, which differ in their resalability, their prices, their sensitivity to shocks, and
their responses to policy interventions. The dependence of an asset's resalability on its price creates
a pecuniary externality, which leads to the result that some policies commonly thought to improve
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Liquidity premia, or convenience yields, are key determinants of asset prices. This point is un-
controversial for ﬁat money, which derives its value solely from its liquidity services. According
to Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010), the same is true for government securities, high-
grade corporate bonds, and agency bonds. In this paper we present a theory of asset liquidity and
convenience yields, based on the following premise: an asset’s liquidity—the extent to which it can
facilitate exchange, as means of payment or as collateral—depends on its vulnerability to fraud. We
address a class of questions related to the cross-sectional dispersion and time-variation of liquidity
premia, such as what fundamental characteristics make some assets have higher turnover and lower
yields than others? What shocks prompt investors to suddenly shift their portfolios towards the
most liquid assets, which leads to widening yield spreads? Are liquid assets more susceptible of
exhibiting excess volatility? And, what types of open-market operations and ﬁnancial regulations
are eﬀective to mitigate aggregate liquidity shortages?
The threat of fraud has been a pervasive friction throughout history. Classical examples include
the clipping of coins in ancient Rome and medieval Europe, and the counterfeiting of banknotes
during the ﬁrst half of the 19th century in the United States (Sargent and Velde, 2002; Mihm,
2007). Modern ﬁnancial assets are no less susceptible to fraud. Intangible means of payment suﬀer
from identity thefts (Schreft, 2007), and mortgage-backed securities are subject to moral hazard
problems and lax incentives that plague the process of securitization (see, among others, Keys,
Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig, 2010).1 Similarly, the fact that some investors can spend resources to
cherry-pick the collateral used to secure risk-sharing arrangements is a concern for participants in
OTC derivative markets.2
We introduce the threat of fraud into a search-theoretic model of asset markets, building on
1The 2010 “Performance and Activity Report” of the SEC details many cases of ﬁnancial fraud related to
mortgage-based securities. Frauds and moral hazard problems in the mortgage market are not new. Snowden
(2010) describes the US mortgage crisis of the late 20s and 30s and the earlier forms of securitization in the 20s. Real
estate bond houses were overappraising properties, they violated underwriting standards, and they substituted bad
loans for performing mortgages in their mortgage pools.
2The International Swap and Derivatives Association (2010) reported that over 78% of OTC derivatives trades
are collateralized. Importantly, market participants consider some asset classes (e.g., cash or government securities)
to be of higher collateral quality than others. Collateral quality depends on various factors such as volatility, credit
risk, and pricing ease.
1recent work in monetary and ﬁnancial economics (e.g., Lagos and Wright, 2005; Duﬃe, Gˆ arleanu,
and Pedersen, 2005). In the ﬁrst period, agents trade an arbitrary number of assets in a competitive
market. In the second period, they trade goods and services in an over-the-counter (OTC) market,
with bilateral meetings and bargaining. Because of the frictions caused by a lack of commitment
and limited enforcement, agents use assets as means of payment, or as collateral, in the OTC
market. However, the extent to which an asset can play such a role is limited by the threat of
fraud: after incurring an asset-speciﬁc ﬁxed cost, an agent can produce fraudulent assets, which
are worthless and indistinguishable from their genuine counterparts. In order to solve the resulting
OTC bargaining problem under asymmetric information, we assume that the asset holder makes a
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, and we use the recent methodology of In and Wright (2011) for signaling
games with hidden choices to select an equilibrium.
A key insight of our analysis is that the threat of fraud generates asset-speciﬁc, endogenous
resalability constraints. While there are no exogenous restrictions on the transfer of assets in
bilateral matches in the OTC market, if the quantity of an asset oﬀered is above some threshold,
then the trade is rejected with positive probability because of the rational fear that the asset might
be fraudulent. In equilibrium, agents never ﬁnd it optimal to oﬀer more of the asset than what
can be accepted with certainty, which prevents fraud from taking place. The resulting endogenous
resalability constraint has three determinants: the asset’s vulnerability to fraud, the diﬀerence
between the asset’s price and the discounted value of its cash ﬂows, and the frequency of trades in
OTC markets. We emphasize three main implications of these endogenous resalability constraints
below.
First, because an asset’s resalability depends on its own vulnerability to fraud, prices and mea-
sures of liquidity vary across assets with identical cash ﬂows. We obtain an endogenous three-tier
categorization of assets: illiquid, partially liquid, and liquid assets, which diﬀer in their resalability,
their price, as well as their sensitivity to shocks and policy interventions. While the price of an
illiquid asset is equal to the present value of its cash ﬂows, the price of a partially liquid or liquid
asset is strictly larger than the present value of its cash ﬂows; i.e., this asset enjoys a liquidity
premium. This premium increases with the asset’s recognizability but decreases with its supply,
which is consistent with the downward-sloping aggregate demand for Treasury debt documented
2in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010). Finally, while the prices of illiquid and partially
liquid assets are constant in the absence of shocks to fundamentals, the prices of liquid assets can
exhibit self-fulﬁlling ﬂuctuations.
Second, in a similar spirit as Guerrieri and Shimer (2011), our model identiﬁes shocks that
generate phenomena akin to ﬂights to liquidity, whereby investors shift their asset demands from
less liquid to more liquid assets, widening the liquidity spread between the two types of assets
(see Longstaﬀ, 2004, and Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter, and Lando, 2010). For instance, we consider
an increase in the frequency of liquidity needs in the OTC market that results in higher demand
for collateral. Such a shock increases the value of holding assets, as they are more likely to be
used as means of payment or as collateral, but it also has the countervailing eﬀect of increasing
fraud incentives. We show that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates for liquid assets and raises their prices,
while the second eﬀect dominates for partially liquid assets and lowers their prices. Moreover,
the set of liquid assets endogenously shrinks, meaning that agents shift their demand to the most
recognizable assets, in accordance with a ﬂight to liquidity. The same phenomenon can be generated
in our model by a shock that raises the threat of fraud for some partially liquid or liquid assets,
thereby reducing their resalability.
The third main implication of our results concerns policies aimed at managing the aggregate
supply of liquidity through open-market operations or ﬁnancial regulations. In our model, an
open-market operation has a positive welfare eﬀect if and only if it increases a simple measure of
aggregate liquidity—a weighted sum of asset supplies. Therefore, a substitution of liquid assets with
other liquid assets is irrelevant. An open-market purchase of illiquid assets with liquid ones, on the
other hand, raises aggregate liquidity and output. However, under a balanced budget requirement,
a purchase of partially liquid assets with liquid ones reduces aggregate liquidity, the yield of liquid
assets, and output. This paradoxical result arises because of a ”pecuniary externality,” according to
which an increase in the price of an asset reduces its resalability, which in turn can lower its liquidity
premium below the true marginal social value of its liquidity services. Due to this externality, a
balanced budget open-market purchase syphons out more liquidity than it is injecting in. This
result can shed some light on quantitative easing, which consists of injecting reserves in exchange
for less liquid assets (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). According to our model, for
3such policies to successfully increase aggregate liquidity, they must target the most illiquid assets.
In a similar vein, we study retention requirements that were introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act to
mitigate moral hazard problems in the securitization process. In the context of our model, such
requirements are welfare improving only if applied to illiquid assets.
1.1 Literature review
Kiyotaki and Moore (2001, 2005) study limited resalability by assuming that each period, agents
cannot sell more than an exogenous proportion of their asset holdings. While such exogenous
resalability constraints can be chosen to replicate our distribution of asset prices, they generate
markedly diﬀerent comparative statics and policy recommendations (see Supplementary Appendix
E). For instance, with proportional resalability constraints, an increase in the frequency of trading
needs weakly increases the prices of all assets, while in our model it has asymmetric eﬀects: it
increases the prices of liquid assets, and decreases the prices of partially liquid assets, consistent
with evidence on ﬂight to liquidity. As another example, with proportional liquidity constraints,
an open-market purchase of partially liquid assets with liquid ones increases liquidity, asset yields,
and welfare. In our model, because of a new pecuniary externality, we obtain the opposite eﬀects,
consistent with evidence on quantitative easing.
In Holmstrom and Tirole’s (2011, and references therein) corporate ﬁnance model, a moral
hazard problem generates endogenous borrowing constraints, i.e., resalability constraints in the
primary asset market. In the secondary market, corporate claims with identical cash ﬂows enjoy the
same liquidity premium. In our model, by contrast, we focus on moral hazard in secondary markets.
We highlight the fact that agents’ incentives to take hidden actions depend on contemporaneous
secondary market prices and on OTC market frictions, and we generate cross-sectional diﬀerences
in liquidity premia between assets with identical cash ﬂows.
The search-theoretic literature on the liquidity structure of asset returns includes, e.g., Wallace
(1998, 2000), Weill (2008), and Lagos (2010), and related work on the rate-of-return-dominance
puzzle. Our approach goes beyond this earlier search literature by showing how cross-sectional
diﬀerences in liquidity arise from fraud-based endogenous resalability constraints.3 Lester, Postle-
3Wallace (1998, 2000) emphasizes assets’ indivisibilities, Weill (2008) assumes increasing returns in the matching
4waite, and Wright (2011) consider a private information problem where agents can recognize the
quality of an asset at some cost, but to determine the terms of trade under asymmetric informa-
tion they make the simplifying assumption that unrecognized assets are not accepted in a bilateral
match.4 They address this issue in an extension that follows our methodology closely.
There is a literature that emphasizes adverse selection problems in asset markets with search
frictions (e.g., Hopenhayn and Werner, 1996). The most closely related papers are Rocheteau (2009)
who introduces an adverse selection problem in a monetary model to explain the illiquidity of risky
assets, and Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010), who consider a competitive search environment to
illustrate how trading delays emerge endogenously to screen high- and low-quality assets. Guerrieri
and Shimer (2011) extend the previous paper to a general equilibrium framework and, among
other results, provide an explanation for ﬂights to liquidity based on a dynamic adverse selection
problem. While the distinction between adverse selection and moral hazard in asset markets is
often subtle, the methodologies for capturing the two frictions diﬀer profoundly. We take the
view that informational asymmetries in asset markets often result from strategic behavior, which
allows us to focus the model more squarely on the eﬀects of the threat of fraud on asset liquidity.
At a more theoretical level, an important distinction between adverse selection and moral hazard
is that the type distribution is exogenous with the former, but is endogenous with the latter.
With an exogenous type distribution, under some conditions, agents can mitigate the asymmetric
information friction by holding broadly diversiﬁed asset portfolios. As our model demonstrates,
when the type distribution is endogenous, the asymmetric information friction remains relevant.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 solves the bargaining game under the threat
of fraud. Section 4 solves for asset prices, and Section 5 presents three main implications. The
appendix contains omitted proofs, and the supplementary appendix presents additional results and
extensions.
technology, and Lagos (2010) introduces exogenous restrictions on the use of some assets as means of payment.
Similarly, Shi (2008) studies the pricing of bonds in a search economy where exogenous legal restrictions prevent
bonds from being used in payments in a fraction of trades.
4There is also a related literature on counterfeiting, e.g., Green and Weber (1996), Williamson and Wright (1994),
and Nosal and Wallace (2007). In those studies, there is a single asset, asset holdings are restricted to {0,1}, and








Figure 1: Timing of the game.
2 The model
The economy lasts for two periods, t ∈{ 0,1}, and is populated by a continuum of agents who
trade sequentially in two markets: in a centralized market (CM) at t = 0, and in a decentralized
over-the-counter market (DM) at t = 1. There are two perfectly divisible and perishable goods.
The ﬁrst good, which we take to be the num´ eraire, is produced and consumed at t = 0 and at
the end of t = 1. The second good, labeled the DM good, is produced and consumed in bilateral
meetings in the DM. There is a ﬁnite set of assets indexed by s ∈ S. Each asset pays oﬀ at the end
of t = 1 a dividend normalized to one unit of the num´ eraire.
Agents are divided evenly into two types, called buyers and sellers. Buyers wish to consume in
the DM but cannot produce, while sellers have the technology to produce goods in the DM but do
not want to consume. Together with frictions described below, this preference structure creates a
need for liquidity: buyers will acquire assets in the CM in order to ﬁnance the purchase of goods
produced by sellers in the DM. The utility of a buyer is:
x0 + β [u(q1)+x1], (1)
where xt ∈ R is the consumption of the num´ eraire good at time t,w i t hxt < 0b e i n gi n t e r p r e t e d
as production, q1 ∈ R+ is the consumption of the DM good, and β ≡ (1 + r)−1 ∈ (0,1) is a
discount factor. The utility function, u(q), over the DM good is twice continuously diﬀerentiable,
with u(0) = 0, u￿(q) > 0, u￿(0) = ∞, u￿(∞) = 0, and u￿￿(q) < 0. The utility of a seller is:
x0 + β (−q1 + x1), (2)
where q1 is the seller’s production in a pairwise meeting in the DM. Let q∗ = argmaxq [u(q) − q] > 0
denote the output level that maximizes the match surplus, so u￿(q∗) = 1.
6The CM is a perfectly competitive market, where agents trade the num´ eraire good and assets.
The DM, on the other hand, is an over-the-counter market, where a fraction σ ∈ (0,1] of buyers
are matched bilaterally and at random with an equal fraction of sellers. Because of a lack of
commitment and limited enforcement, buyers purchase DM goods with assets or, equivalently, with
loans collateralized by assets (see footnote 11).
Terms of trade in pairwise meetings in the DM are determined according to a simple bargaining
game, in which the buyer makes a take-or-leave-it oﬀer.5 The buyer, whose asset holdings are private
information, asks for a given amount of the DM good in exchange for some speciﬁed portfolio of
assets.6 The seller accepts or rejects the oﬀer. If the seller accepts the oﬀer, then the trade is
implemented, provided that the asset transfer is feasible given the buyer’s asset holdings. Matched
agents split apart before assets pay oﬀ.
We introduce the possibility of asset fraud as follows. In the CM at t = 0, a buyer can pay a
ﬁxed cost k(s) > 0 to produce any quantity of fraudulent asset of type s. Fraudulent assets have
zero terminal value and, in the DM, cannot be distinguished by sellers from genuine assets.
2.1 Interpretations
Counterfeiting of a means of payment. A literal interpretation of the model concerns assets
used as means of payment, such as coins or banknotes, for which the fraud consists of producing
counterfeits.7 During the ﬁrst half of the 19th century, the ﬁxed cost to produce fake banknotes in-
cluded the cost to acquire plates and dies. See, e.g., Mihm (2007). Nowadays, this cost corresponds
to the price of photo-editing software and copy machines.
5In her discussion of our paper, Veronica Guerrieri investigated a version of the model with competitive search
and showed that this alternative pricing mechanism generates the same liquidity constraint as the one obtained under
our simple bargaining game.
6By assuming that asset holdings are unobservable, we reduce the set of signals sent by a buyer, which simpliﬁes
the analysis. As shown in the earlier version of our working paper, results are robust to alternative assumptions
regarding the observability of asset holdings. Also, we do not allow buyers to oﬀer lotteries over allocations. In
our context we conjecture that it is with no loss in generality, but such lotteries could be useful in the presence of
alternative cost structures of producing fraudulent assets—see Supplementary Appendix C on variable costs.
7Our model can accommodate fraud on unsecured credit in bilateral matches. In this case, an agent has the
option to produce a fake identity in the CM at a ﬁxed cost (e.g., the cost incurred by a computer hacker to steal the
identity of someone else) and he can issue an IOU in the DM if matched. The repayment of genuine IOUs can be
enforced in the following CM. In contrast, IOUs based on fake identities are not repaid.
7Collateral fraud. An alternative interpretation is that buyers use assets as collateral to secure
loans to be repaid at the end of t = 1. If the asset is a house, the transaction in the DM is an equity
extraction loan to ﬁnance consumption. An example of mortgage fraud that closely resembles our
model is the property ﬂipping scheme, whereby a buyer obtains a high-loan-to-value mortgage
based on a fake property appraisal, and the bank is left with worthless collateral.8 In this example,
the cost of producing fraudulent assets represents the cost of creating false documentation about
the borrower and the property. The DM can also be interpreted as an OTC market for credit
derivatives, such as the market for credit default swaps or interest rate swaps. In that context, the
goods traded in the DM are risk-sharing services, and collateral is used to mitigate counterparty
risk.9 The cost of producing fraudulent assets is the informational cost incurred by the buyer to
identify bad collateral. This cost is related to the complexity of the asset, its issuer, and the quality
and quantity of information released about the asset’s cash ﬂows.
Securitization fraud. In this context buyers represent mortgage securitizers who originate and
package loans in the CM. Sellers represent ﬁnal asset holders who acquire securitized assets in
the DM. There are gains from trading assets in the DM because it allows mortgage securitizers
to spread the risk of the underlying loans to ﬁnal asset holders.10 In this example, the cost of
producing fraudulent assets is the cost of generating false documentation about the underlying
security, bribing an agency for a good rating, or engaging in accounting frauds.
3 Bargaining under the threat of fraud
In this section we solve for the equilibrium of the game between a buyer and a seller matched at
random. The game starts in the CM at t = 0 and ends in the DM at t = 1. For now we take as
given asset prices in the CM, φ(s), s ∈ S, and we anticipate that, in equilibrium, they will satisfy
8See http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/white collar/mortgage-fraud/mortgage fraud.
9In Supplementary Appendix G, we provide an explicit model of risk-sharing arrangements, where the DM good
can be interpreted as risk-sharing services.
10In Supplementary Appendix H, we provide such a model of securitization, where agents have Constant Absolute
Risk Aversion (CARA) utilities. This model conﬁrms, albeit with diﬀerent functional forms, that u(q)c a nb e
interpreted as the utility of reducing the securitizer’s risk position, and q = c(q) can be interpreted as the cost of
increasing the ﬁnal asset holder’s risk position.
8φ(s) ≥ β; i.e., the rate of return of asset s is no greater than the discount rate, which would be the
“fundamental price” of the asset in a frictionless economy.
The sequence of moves is as follows: (i) In the CM at t = 0, the buyer chooses a portfolio of
{a(s)} genuine and {˜ a(s)} fraudulent assets, subject to a(s) ≥ 0 and ˜ a(s) ≥ 0; (ii) In the DM
at t = 1, the buyer is matched with a seller with probability σ, in which case he makes an oﬀer
(q,{d(s)}), where q represents the output produced by the seller and d(s) is the transfer of assets
of type s (genuine or fraudulent) from the buyer to the seller; (iii) The seller decides whether to
accept the oﬀer; (iv) If the oﬀer is accepted, the seller delivers q units of goods to the buyer, and
the buyer delivers τ(s) ∈ [0,a(s)] genuine and ˜ τ(s) ∈ [0,˜ a(s)] fraudulent units of asset s to the
seller, with τ(s)+˜ τ(s)=d(s).11


















where I{˜ a(s)>0} = 1 if the buyer produces fraudulent assets of type s,˜ a(s) > 0, and zero otherwise.
In the above, µ = 1 if the buyer meets a seller who accepts his oﬀer, and µ = 0 otherwise. The ﬁrst
term is the payoﬀ of the buyer at t = 0. In order to accumulate ˜ a(s) > 0 fraudulent units of asset
s, the buyer must incur the ﬁxed cost k(s). In order to accumulate a(s) units of genuine asset s,h e
must produce φ(s)a(s) units of the num´ eraire good in the CM. The second term is the discounted
payoﬀ at t =1i fµ = 1; i.e., if the buyer meets a seller in the DM and his oﬀer is accepted. He
then enjoys the utility of DM good consumption, u(q), as well as the payoﬀ from his net holding
of genuine assets, a(s) − τ(s), the initial amount purchased net of the asset transfer to the seller,
keeping in mind that each unit of genuine asset pays oﬀ one unit of the num´ eraire good at the end
of t = 1. The last term is, similarly, the discounted payoﬀ of the buyer at t =1i fµ = 0. Collecting
11We can reinterpret the payment, (q,{d(s)}), as a fully collateralized loan, where the buyer promises to repay ￿
s∈S d(s) units of the CM output at the end of period 1. In order to secure the repayment of the loan, the buyer
posts d(s)u n i t so fa s s e ts as collateral with a third party. If one asset is fraudulent, then the buyer will choose to
default on his obligation, in which case the seller seizes the assets that serve as collateral. If all assets are genuine,
then the buyer is indiﬀerent between repaying his debt or defaulting.




























where we anticipate that, in equilibrium, sellers will not ﬁnd it optimal to accumulate assets in the
CM.12 If the seller accepts the oﬀer (µ = 1), he suﬀers the disutility of producing, q, and receives
τ(s) genuine units of asset s.
Equilibrium concept. Our equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: actions are
sequentially rational following every history, and beliefs accord with Bayes’s rule whenever it is
possible. The notion of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium imposes little discipline on the seller’s belief
in the DM regarding the decision of the buyer in the initial stage of the game to produce fraudulent
assets, conditional on an oﬀ-equilibrium oﬀer being made. Our approach to circumvent this diﬃ-
culty consists of adopting a notion of strategic stability, according to which any equilibrium of the
original game should also be an equilibrium of the reverse-ordered game, with the following timing:
(i) The buyer determines his DM oﬀer, (q,{d(s)}), before making any decision in the CM (e.g.,
one interpretation is that he posts an oﬀer at the beginning of the CM for the next DM); (ii) He
chooses his portfolio composed of genuine and fraudulent assets; (iii) He is matched with a seller
who chooses whether to accept or reject the oﬀer.13 This reordered game captures the idea that
12Sellers have no strict incentives to accumulate assets if φ(s) ≥ β, because their asset holdings are not observable
and hence do not aﬀect the terms of trade oﬀered by the buyer.
13The re-ordering methodology, called the reordering invariance reﬁnement, was developed by In and Wright
(2011) for signaling games with unobservable choices. This reﬁnement is based on the invariance condition of strategic
stability from Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), which requires that the solution of a game should also be the solution
of any game with the same reduced normal form. (The intuitive criterion does not apply to our game because
in contrast to standard signaling games types are endogenous.) Beside being powerful in selecting equilibria and
tractable (because subgame perfection becomes suﬃcient to solve the game), this equilibrium notion has a strong
decision-theoretic justiﬁcation and nice normative properties. Speciﬁcally, in our model the reordered game captures
the idea that upon seeing the buyer’s oﬀer, the seller will infer that the buyer’s unobservable actions (portfolio and
production of fraudulent assets) were chosen optimally with the oﬀer in mind. (This forward induction logic is
reminiscent to the one of most reﬁnements in the signaling literature.) From a normative viewpoint, this reﬁnement
has the appealing property of selecting an equilibrium of the original game that yields the highest payoﬀ to the buyer,
the agent making the oﬀer. A more detailed description of the merits of this approach is provided in In and Wright
(2011).
10upon seeing the buyer’s oﬀer, the seller will infer that the buyer’s unobservable actions (portfolio
and production of fraudulent assets) were chosen optimally with the oﬀer in mind. The reﬁnement
is intuitive in that it selects an equilibrium of the original game that yields the highest payoﬀ to
the player making the oﬀer, in our case the buyer. Moreover, it improves tractability as subgame
perfection becomes suﬃcient to solve the game.
Solving for equilibrium. The analysis of the game can be simpliﬁed by making two observations.
First, because of the ﬁxed cost, the buyer will either produce the quantity of fraudulent assets that is
necessary to execute the oﬀer in a match or he will produce no fraudulent asset at all. Consequently,
˜ τ(s)=[ 1− χ(s)]d(s) and τ(s)=χ(s)d(s), where χ(s) = 0 if the buyer produces fraudulent assets,
and χ(s) = 1 otherwise. Moreover, the buyer must be able to cover his intended transfer of genuine
assets; i.e., a(s) ≥ χ(s)d(s).
Second, we can solve for the buyer’s optimal asset demand before solving for equilibrium oﬀers.
Indeed, if φ(s)=β, it follows from the buyer’s payoﬀ, (3), that any demand satisfying the constraint
a(s) ≥ χ(s)d(s) is optimal. If φ(s) >β , it is costly to hold assets, and so it is optimal to demand
a(s)=χ(s)d(s). In both cases, substituting the optimal asset demands into the objective amounts
to replacing a(s)w i t hχ(s)d(s).
With these observations in mind, a buyer’s strategy speciﬁes the following two objects: the
oﬀer, (q,{d(s)}), and conditional on any oﬀer, a probability distribution over {χ(s)}∈{ 0,1}S,
denoted by η. The seller’s strategy speciﬁes, conditional on any oﬀer (q,{d(s)}), the probability of
accepting, denoted by π.
The game is solved by backward induction. Following an oﬀer, (q,{d(s)}), the seller’s decision
to accept a trade must be optimal given the buyer’s decision to produce fraudulent assets; i.e.,










where η(s) denotes the marginal probability of bringing genuine assets of type s.14 The seller’s
value of accepting the oﬀer depends on the disutility of producing q units of goods and on the
14Note that, after replacing a(s)a n dτ(s)w i t hχ(s)d(s) in (3) and (4), the payoﬀs of buyers and sellers become
linear functions of the binary actions {χ(s)}. Therefore, taking expectations with respect to η amounts to replacing
χ(s) with the marginal probability η(s).
11expected quality of the asset transfer, determined by η.
Similarly, following an oﬀer (q,{d(s)}), the buyer’s decision to bring genuine or fraudulent assets







k(s)[1− ˆ η(s)] + [φ(s) − β]ˆ η(s)d(s)+βσπˆ η(s)d(s)
￿
, (6)
where the expression that is maximized consists of the terms in the buyer’s payoﬀ that depend on
η. It shows that there are two gains from producing fraudulent assets: the savings in the holding
cost, φ(s) − β, and the savings in the expected cost of transferring genuine assets to a seller.
















A perfect Bayesian equilibrium that satisﬁes the reordering invariance reﬁnement is a pair of buyer’s
and seller’s strategies satisfying (5), (6), and (7). The next proposition provides a simple joint
characterization of the asset demands and the oﬀers made in any equilibrium.













d(s) − q = 0 (9)
d(s) ≤
k(s)
φ(s) − β + βσ
, for all s ∈ S (10)
d(s) ∈ [0,a(s)], for all s ∈ S. (11)
Moreover, following any equilibrium oﬀer, the buyer transfers genuine assets with probability one,
η(s)=1for all s, and the seller accepts the oﬀer with probability one, π =1 .
Proposition 1 shows that equilibrium asset demands and oﬀers maximize the buyer’s expected
utility subject to three constraints. First is the individual rationality constraint, (9), which states
that the seller must be indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting the oﬀer, given that the buyer’s
12assets are genuine. The seller’s expected payoﬀ is zero since the bargaining protocol speciﬁes that
the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. Second is the incentive compatibility constraint, (10),
which states that the buyer must ﬁnd it optimal to accumulate genuine assets with probability one,
given that the seller accepts with probability one. Third is the feasibility constraint, (11), which
states that the buyer must hold enough genuine assets to cover his transfer to the seller.
To understand why the buyer ﬁnds it optimal to bring genuine assets with probability one,
consider a candidate equilibrium in which he brings genuine assets of type s0 with a probability
η(s0) ∈ (0,1).15 In this candidate equilibrium, the buyer’s payment capacity is slack. To see this,
notice that the buyer could deviate and demand higher consumption in the DM, q￿ >q ,k e e pt h e
same {d(s)}, and compensate the seller by bringing genuine assets of type s0 with higher probability,
η￿(s0) >η (s0). This deviation would not change the buyer’s expected cost of transferring assets,
since he is indiﬀerent between genuine or fraudulent assets of type s0. Moreover, by (6), indiﬀerence
implies:
k(s0)=[ φ(s) − β + βσπ]d(s0)= ⇒ π =
k(s0) − [φ(s0) − β]d(s0)
βσd(s0)
;
i.e., the seller’s probability of acceptance, π, is pinned down by the transfer d(s0), and is unaﬀected
by the increase in q. Taken together, these observations mean that the buyer could increase his
payoﬀ by raising his oﬀer q without changing his expected cost of transferring the asset, and without
changing the seller’s acceptance probability.
Lastly, the proposition shows that, in equilibrium, the buyer always ﬁnds it optimal to make an
oﬀer that is accepted with probability one. This result is not obvious because oﬀering more assets
than the threshold of equation (10) has two eﬀects going in opposite directions. The positive eﬀect
is that the buyer can demand a higher q in exchange for a higher d. The negative eﬀect is that
a larger oﬀer increases fraud incentives, and hence it has a positive probability of being rejected.
Our proof shows that, with the ﬁxed cost of producing fraudulent assets, the negative eﬀect always
dominates.16
15Looking at η(s0) > 0 is without loss. See the proof of Proposition 1 for details.
16In Supplementary Appendix C, we show that the negative eﬀect also dominates if we add proportional costs of
producing fraudulent assets provided that those costs are not too large. If the proportional costs are large relative
to the ﬁxed costs, then there can be situations where fraud generates rationing both at the intensive margin (the
quantity of assets that can be transferred in a match) and at the extensive margin (the number of matches in which
trade occurs).
13Endogenous resalability constraints. Perhaps the most important result of Proposition 1 is
that the incentive-compatibility constraints, (10), take the form of resalability constraints, speci-
fying upper bounds on the transfer of assets from buyers to sellers.17 The resalability constraints
depend on the cost of producing fraudulent assets, k(s), the holding cost of an asset, φ(s)−β, and
the frequency of trades in the DM, σ.
From (10), an asset which is more susceptible to fraud is subject to a more stringent resalability
constraint. To illustrate this point, suppose that there are no search frictions, σ = 1. Then,
the resalability constraint of asset s is φ(s)d(s) ≤ k(s). The real value of the asset that can be
transferred in a bilateral match is simply the cost of producing fraudulent assets. In accordance
with the Wallace (1998) dictum, the liquidity of an asset depends on its intrinsic properties, which
here are captured by the ease of producing fraudulent assets.
The resalability constraints also depend on the frequency of trade in the DM. Increasing the
frequency of trade exacerbates the threat of fraud because the trade surplus of a con artist, u(q),
is greater than the match surplus of an honest buyer, u(q) − q. Therefore, the upper bound must
be lowered to keep incentives in line. To give a concrete example, if the process of securitization
implies that an asset can be retraded more frequently, then an increase in securitization raises the
threat of fraud and makes resalability constraints more likely to bind.18
Finally, the holding cost of the asset, φ(s) − β, enters the resalability constraint, because lack
of commitment forces agents to accumulate assets before liquidity needs occur. An increase in the
asset price raises the holding cost, which raises the buyer’s incentives to produce fraudulent versions
of the asset for a given size of the trade.
4 The liquidity structure of asset returns
In this section we study the implications of our model for cross-sectional liquidity premia. We
endogenize asset prices in the CM and show that the endogenous resalability constraints derived in
17If the asset is interpreted as an IOU (see Footnote 7), s = ￿,t h e no n ec a ns e tφ(￿)=β since an IOU is issued
in the DM and there is no cost of holding it. In this case the incentive-compatibility constraint, (10), takes the form
of a borrowing constraint, d(￿) ≤
k(￿)
βσ .
18Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010) establish evidence that the securitization of subprime loans led to lax
screening. Purnanandam (2009) ﬁnds that banks involved highly in the originate-to-distribute market, where the
originator of loans sells them to third parties, originated excessively poor-quality mortgages.
14Proposition 1 create liquidity and price diﬀerences across assets, even if they have the same cash
ﬂows. Our results help explain diﬀerences in asset prices that cannot be fully accounted for by
risk, and shed light on a variety of evidence on the positive relationship between liquidity and asset
prices.19
4.1 The liquidity-return trade-oﬀ
Assume that each asset s ∈ S comes in ﬁxed supply, denoted by A(s). We deﬁne a symmetric
equilibrium to be a collection of prices, {φ(s)}, asset demands, {a(s)}, and a DM oﬀer, (q,{d(s)}),
such that the asset demands and the oﬀer solve the buyer’s problem (8)-(11) given prices, and the
asset market clears; i.e., a(s)=A(s) for all s ∈ S.20







φ(s)=β + ν(s), (13)
for all s ∈ S,w h e r eξ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier of the seller’s participation constraint, (9),
λ(s) ≥ 0 is the multiplier of the resalability constraint, (10), and ν(s) ≥ 0 is the multiplier of the
feasibility constraint, (11). The multiplier, ξ, measures the net utility of spending an additional
unit of asset in the DM, if matched with a seller with probability σ. The increased consumption
yields marginal utility u￿(q) to the buyer, and the asset transfer has an opportunity cost equal to
one.
Taken together, (12) and (13) imply the following bounds on asset prices:
β ≤ φ(s) ≤ β + ξ. (14)
The upper bound is the present value of the asset’s cash ﬂow, β, which we refer to as the ”fun-
damental value” of the asset, augmented by the net utility of spending an additional unit of the
asset in the DM, ξ. The lower bound is the “fundamental value” of the asset, β, since a buyer can
19Since Amihud and Mendelson (1986), liquidity (level and risk) has been shown to explain risk-adjusted asset
return diﬀerentials. For recent studies, see, e.g., Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2009).
20The symmetry restriction that all buyers have the same asset demands serves to pin down portfolios when some
assets are priced at their fundamental values, φ(s)=β.
15always hold onto any unit of the asset and consume its cash ﬂow at the end of t = 1. Assuming for
now that q<q ∗, so that ξ>0, these ﬁrst-order conditions imply that there are three categories of
assets.
Liquid assets. For this type of asset, the feasibility constraint is binding, ν(s) > 0, but
the resalability constraint is slack, λ(s) = 0. Therefore, the asset price is equal to the upper
bound, β + ξ. The asset is said to be perfectly liquid in the following sense: if the buyer holds
an additional unit of the asset, he would spend it in the DM. Substituting the market clearing
condition, a(s)=A(s), and the price, φ(s)=β + ξ, into the binding feasibility constraint and the
slack resalability constraint, we obtain d(s)=A(s) ≤
k(s)
ξ+βσ. This last inequality can be equivalently
written as κ(s) ≥ βσ + ξ,w h e r eκ(s) ≡ k(s)/A(s) is the cost of fraud per unit of the asset.
partially liquid assets. For this type of asset, both the resalability and feasibility constraints
bind, λ(s) > 0 and ν(s) > 0. In equilibrium, a buyer spends all his holdings of the asset. However, if
he were to acquire an additional unit, he would choose not to spend it in the DM, for otherwise there
would be a positive probability of the trade being rejected. The asset is thus said to be partially
liquid and its price must be lower than the upper bound. From (10), d(s)=A(s)=
k(s)
φ(s)−β+βσ,
which leads to φ(s)=β + κ(s) − βσ, keeping in mind that κ(s)=k(s)/A(s). The conditions
λ(s)=ξ + β − φ(s) > 0 and ν(s)=φ(s) − β>0 can be written as βσ < κ(s) <β σ+ ξ.
Illiquid assets. Lastly, there are assets for which the resalability constraint binds, λ(s) > 0,
but the feasibility constraint is slack, ν(s) = 0. In equilibrium the buyer does not spend a fraction
of his asset holdings even though he is liquidity constrained. Therefore, the asset is said to be
illiquid, and its price is equal to the lower bound, φ(s)=β. The binding resalability constraint
implies that d(s)=
k(s)
βσ . Substituting this expression into the slack feasibility constraint, we obtain
that κ(s) ≤ βσ.














16That is, the buyer either transfers all his holdings of asset s, or the maximum holding consistent
with the resalability constraint and the no-arbitrage restriction that φ(s) ≥ β.S u b s t i t u t i n g t h e
expression for d(s) into the seller’s binding participation constraint, (9), we obtain




The aggregate liquidity, L, is a weighted average of asset supplies, with endogenous weights de-
pending on trading frictions and assets’ recognizability characteristics.21 Given q, the convenience
yield of liquid assets, ξ, is determined by (12). One can easily verify that, if L<q ∗, the above asset
prices, oﬀer, and asset demands constitute a symmetric equilibrium. The condition L<q ∗ means
that the aggregate liquidity is not large enough to satiate buyers’ liquidity needs, represented by
q∗.I fL ≥ q∗, then the equilibrium has q = q∗ and φ(s)=β for all s ∈ S. Summarizing:
Proposition 2 (The liquidity-return relationship) There exists a unique symmetric equi-
librium. If L ≥ q∗, then q = q∗ and φ(s)=β for all s ∈ S.I f L<q ∗, then q<q ∗,
ξ ≡ βσ[u￿(q) − 1] > 0. Letting κ ≡ βσ,a n dκ ≡ βσ + ξ, there are three categories of assets:
1. Liquid assets: for any s ∈ S, such that κ(s) ≥ κ,
φ(s)=β + ξ (16)
θ(s)=1 . (17)
2. Partially liquid assets: for any s ∈ S, such that κ(s) ∈ (κ,κ),
φ(s)=β +[ κ(s) − βσ] (18)
θ(s)=1 . (19)






21This approach is consistent with a deﬁnition of the quantity of money suggested by Friedman and Schwartz
(1970) as ”the weighted sum of the aggregate value of all assets, the weights varying with the degree of moneyness.”
Our deﬁnition of aggregate liquidity is also related to the Divisia monetary aggregates (e.g., Barnett, Fisher, and
Serletis, 1992). A key diﬀerence is that in our approach the weight assigned to an asset in order to calculate liquidity
changes is not equal to its holding cost, which has normative implications that we discuss in Section 5.
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Figure 2: The liquidity structure of asset returns
The central implication of Proposition 2 is that, whenever there is a liquidity shortage, L<q ∗,
assets with identical cash ﬂows can have diﬀerent prices. See Figure 2 for a graphical representation
of these price diﬀerences. This departure from the no-arbitrage principle is another formulation of
the rate-of-return dominance puzzle, according to which monetary assets coexist with other assets
with similar risk characteristics that generate a higher yield. In our model price diﬀerentials across
assets are attributed to diﬀerences in the cost of fraud. An asset which is more recognizable—
in the sense of not being sensitive to fraudulent activities—as captured by a high cost of fraud,
is used more intensively to ﬁnance random spending opportunities. Relative to assets that are
less recognizable, this asset generates some non-pecuniary liquidity services, ν(s)=φ(s) − β, also
referred to as a convenience yield, and is sold at a higher price.22
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010, 2011) document the existence of convenience
yields for Treasury securities and, to a lesser extent, highly-rated bonds. They argue that a safety-
22To see why the price diﬀerentials do not represent arbitrage opportunities, relax the short-selling constraint and
assume that, in order to sell an asset he does not own, an agent has to borrow it from someone else in exchange for a
fee, to be determined in equilibrium. The agent who borrows the asset can use it in the DM, but the agent who lends
it cannot. The equilibrium remains unchanged, and the fee clearing the market for borrowing asset s ∈ S is equal to
its convenience yield, φ(s) − β. Indeed, an agent who borrows a liquid or partially liquid asset must compensate the
lender for his forgone liquidity services in the DM.
18premium (which they view as distinct from a standard risk premium) is an important component of
asset prices. Through the lens of our model, we can interpret this safety premium as the premium
oﬀered by assets that are highly recognizable and that are less sensitive to informational asym-
metries and moral hazard considerations. Similarly, Vickery and Wright (2010) argue about the
existence of a liquidity premium for agency mortgage-backed securities, which are better protected
against the informational asymmetries that plague the process of securitization.
Proposition 2 also has insights for cross-sectional diﬀerences in transaction velocity, a standard
measure of liquidity in monetary economies. In our model, transaction velocity in the DM is
V(s) ≡
σd(s)
A(s) = σθ(s). Proposition 2 predicts a positive relationship between the price of an asset
and its velocity. The most liquid assets (i.e., any asset s such that κ(s) ≥ ¯ κ) trade at the highest
price, and their velocity is maximum and equal to the frequency of spending opportunities in the
DM, σ. Illiquid assets (i.e., any asset s such that κ(s) <κ), however, have the highest rate of return,
equal to the rate of time preference, and the lowest velocities, less than σ. This result is consistent
with the view that bonds that are used more intensely as collateral in OTC markets tend to have
higher prices (Duﬃe, 1996).
In reality, a myriad of assets are not used as means of payment or collateral. This observation
is consistent with our results if there is a mass of assets that do not circulate in the DM, θ(s) = 0.
From (21) such assets must be characterized by κ(s) = 0: these are assets for which agents have so
little knowledge about their mere existence or attributes, that even simple, costless frauds can be
deceptive.23
5 Applications and Extensions
In this last section we apply our model of the liquidity structure of asset returns to analyze ﬂight-
to-liquidity phenomena and to assess the eﬀectiveness of aggregate liquidity management policies.
Moreover, we extend the model to an inﬁnite time horizon in order to study time variations in
liquidity premia.
23That assets, or claims on those assets, can be counterfeited at no cost has been the standard explanation in
monetary theory for why capital goods are illiquid, since Freeman (1985), and more recently, Lester, Postlewaite, and
Wright (2011).
195.1 Flights to liquidity
A ﬂight to liquidity occurs when market participants seek to reallocate their portfolios toward
highly liquid assets, which leads to a widening yield spread between liquid and less liquid assets.24
In what follows, we apply our analysis on the liquidity structure of asset returns to identify the
shocks that can generate a simultaneous increase in the prices of the most-liquid assets and a
reduction in the prices of less-liquid ones—a phenomenon resembling a ﬂight to liquidity.
According to our model, a ﬂight to liquidity can be explained by an exogenous reduction in k(s)
for some initially liquid or partially liquid assets that make them become illiquid. For instance,
agents might realize that some assets (e.g., MBS) can be subject to a broader set of fraudulent
practices than previously thought.25 The resalability and velocity of these assets decrease, which
causes aggregate liquidity and output to fall, and the liquidity premium on liquid assets, ξ,t o
increase.26 The prices of partially liquid assets do not change, except for the ones that are charac-
terized by a lower cost of fraud. In addition, an increase in the threat of fraud can shrink the set
of liquid assets, while it expands the set of illiquid and partially liquid ones. Indeed, the threshold
¯ κ = βσ+ ξ and the interval ¯ κ − κ = ξ are increasing functions of the size of the liquidity premium
on liquid assets. Therefore, during a ﬂight to liquidity, market demand for assets is concentrated
on a smaller set of highly recognizable assets.
An alternative explanation for a ﬂight to liquidity is an increase in σ that formalizes an aggregate
liquidity demand shock, e.g., an increase in counterparty risk, leading to an increase in the demand
for collateral for OTC transactions.27 From (16) and (18) when σ increases the prices of liquid
24During the 1998 Russian-default crisis, many investors shifted their funds into the more liquid U.S. Treasury
market, widening the yield spread between Treasury bonds and less-liquid debt instruments (Longstaﬀ, 2004). Ev-
idence also shows that, during the subprime crisis, the ﬂight-to-quality was conﬁned to AAA-rated bonds, and the
illiquidity component of the rate of return of bonds with lower grades rose sharply (Longstaﬀ, 2010; Dick-Nielsen,
Feldhutter, and Lando, 2010).
25For some prominent economists this type of shock is a central explanation for the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008. In
an interview to the Wall Street journal (09/24/2011), Robert Lucas argued that ”the shock came because complex
mortgage-related securities minted by Wall Street and certiﬁed as safe by rating agencies had become part of the
eﬀective liquidity supply of the system. All of a sudden, a whole bunch of this stuﬀ turns out to be crap”.
26Some recent studies (e.g., Ajello, 2010; Shi, 2011) formulate the hypothesis that recessions are driven by liquidity
shocks formalized by a reduction in the exogenous resalability of some assets. In contrast to our approach, these
models have the counterfactual implication that the prices of the assets that become more diﬃcult to resell increase.
27Suppose, for instance, that a fraction σu of the trades in the DM can be ﬁnanced with unsecured debt (e.g.,
because commitment/enforcement is available in those meetings) while a fraction σs of the trades require collateral
to be posted because of counterparty risk (e.g., sellers in those meetings cannot commit or cannot be forced to repay
20assets rise, whereas the prices of partially liquid assets fall. The increase in the prices of liquid
assets occurs due to two eﬀects going in the same direction. There is a direct eﬀect according
to which liquid assets are used more often as collateral or means of payment, which raises their
liquidity value. The indirect eﬀect is to reduce aggregate liquidity: from (15), an increase in σ
lowers the weights of illiquid assets in L, which reduces the output in bilateral matches and makes
liquid assets even more useful; i.e., the term β [u￿(q) − 1] in (12) goes up. For partially liquid assets
the increase in σ has the additional markedly diﬀerent eﬀect of exacerbating fraud incentives. As
a result, their prices have to fall so that their resalability constraints hold, re-establishing buyers’
incentives to bring genuine assets. As shown in Figure 2, the set of illiquid and partially liquid
assets expands (because κ increases with σ and ¯ κ−κ increases with ξ) while the set of liquid assets
shrinks (because ¯ κ increases in ξ).
5.2 Liquidity management
In this section we use our model to study the eﬀectiveness of policies aimed at managing the
supply of liquidity in the economy. These policies can take the form of open-market operations by
the central bank, which are intended to substitute liquid assets for less-liquid ones, or regulatory
measures that reduce the threat of frauds and relax resalability constraints for some assets.
Measuring the social value of assets’ liquidity services. Much of the analysis that follows is
based on the following theoretical observation. In competitive models with reduced-form demand
for liquidity (e.g., cash-in-advance or money-in-the-utility function), the convenience yield of an
asset not only measures the marginal private value of its liquidity services, but also its marginal
social value.28 In our model this property holds true for illiquid and liquid assets, but fails to hold
for partially liquid assets.
The marginal social value of the liquidity services provided by a unit of asset s is ∂L
∂A(s)ξ,
which is equal to ξ for liquid and partially liquid assets, and 0 for illiquid assets. Therefore, the
convenience yield of partially liquid assets, φ(s) − β<ξ ,underestimates the true marginal social
their debt.) An increase in counterparty risk can be formalized as an increase in σs such that σs + σu is unchanged.
28This logic is underlying the calculation for the welfare cost of inﬂation in Lucas (2000), the measure of the
liquidity services provided by Treasuries in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010), and Barnett, Fisher, and
Serletis’s (1992) deﬁnition of Divisia monetary aggregates.
21value of their liquidity services. The reason for this discrepancy is that an increase in the price of
an asset reduces its demand in two ways: by raising the holding cost, φ(s) − β, and by tightening
the resalability constraint. The latter eﬀect creates a negative “pecuniary externality,” which can
depress asset prices below the marginal social value of the asset’s liquidity services.29 As we show
below, this observation implies that liquidity management policies targeting partially liquid assets
can be welfare reducing, because they underestimate these assets’ true contribution to aggregate
liquidity. By contrast, when targeting illiquid assets, the same policies are welfare improving.
Open-market purchases. Central banks routinely engage in aggregate liquidity management,
by issuing (or withdrawing) reserves, the most liquid assets, in exchange for Treasuries and, in recent
years, a wider range of less liquid assets, including agency bonds and mortgage-backed securities.
Consider a policy-maker in the CM, who sells a quantity, ∆A(s), of some liquid asset s from his
portfolio, and simultaneously purchases a quantity, ∆A(s￿), of some other asset s￿. A small open-
market operation has a small eﬀect on prices, so that the budget constraint of the policy-maker is,
to a ﬁrst-order approximation, φ(s)∆A(s)+φ(s￿)∆A(s￿) = 0. The welfare eﬀect of such a policy is


















Suppose ﬁrst that κ(s￿) > ¯ κ, so both s and s￿ are liquid assets. Then, φ(s)=φ(s￿), ∂L
∂A(s￿) = 1,
and ∆L = 0. Such an open-market operation is irrelevant: it does not change aggregate liquidity
and welfare, and hence it has no eﬀect on output and asset prices. So liquidity management has
real eﬀects only if it involves assets with diﬀerent degrees of liquidity.
Suppose next that κ(s￿) <κ, asset s￿ is illiquid. In this case aggregate liquidity does increase
because the purchase of illiquid assets has no consequence on aggregate liquidity; i.e., ∆L × ξ =
∆A(s)×ξ>0. Thus, welfare increases, the price of liquid assets decreases, and the price of illiquid
assets is unaﬀected.
Finally, suppose that κ(s￿) ∈ (κ, ¯ κ); i.e., asset s￿ is partially liquid. Then, φ(s￿) <φ (s) and






∆A(s) × ξ<0, implying that such a policy reduces aggregate liquidity and
29By contrast, with the exogenous proportional resalability constraint, there is no such pecuniary externality, and
asset convenience yields coincide with the marginal social value of the asset’s liquidity services. See Supplementary
Appendix E.
22welfare. The intuition is in line with our earlier observation: while partially liquid and liquid assets
have diﬀerent prices, they contribute equally to aggregate liquidity. At the same time, because it
has a higher price, one share of a liquid asset buys more than one share of a partially liquid one.
Thus a balanced-budget open-market operation ends up syphoning out more liquidity than it is
injecting in; i.e., aggregate liquidity is reduced. The welfare eﬀect of this open-market operation is
of the opposite sign of the yield diﬀerence between the asset that is withdrawn and the asset that
is injected, and the prices of both assets s and s￿ increase.
The results above can help interpret some of the ﬁndings in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011) regarding the eﬀect of quantitative easing. They ﬁnd that the purchases of
Treasuries, agency bonds, and highly-rated corporate bonds in exchange for reserves led to a drop
in interest rates but it did not aﬀect the yields on relatively illiquid assets (Baa corporate bonds).
This ﬁnding is consistent with our results if we interpret Baa corporate bonds as illiquid assets,
Treasuries and highly rated bonds as partially liquid, and reserves as fully liquid. Furthermore,
according to our ﬁndings, the drop in interest rates indicates that quantitative easing reduced
liquidity and welfare.
Regulatory measures. Some of the leading regulatory measures of the Dodd-Frank Act aim
to curb fraud incentives in the securitization industry.30 One of these measures is a requirement
for securitizers to retain at least 5 percent of the credit risk they originate. Importantly, some
asset-backed securities, deemed of higher quality, are exempted from this requirement. In this
section, we study the optimality and welfare impact of retention requirements. We show that the
regulator faces a trade-oﬀ between the role these requirements play as a discipline mechanism and
the distortion they introduce by increasing the costs of holding assets. We demonstrate that the
ﬁrst eﬀect dominates for illiquid assets, while the second eﬀect dominates for partially liquid and
liquid assets. Hence, our model suggests that retention requirements should be conﬁned to the least
liquid assets, i.e., the ones more susceptible to fraud.
Under a retention requirement policy, a buyer who wishes to transfer d(s) units of asset s in
the DM must hold 1 + ρ(s) units of the asset; i.e., d(s) ≤
a(s)
1+ρ(s),w h e r eρ(s) is the retention rate
30The Dodd-Frank Act, enacted in July 2010 in response to the 2007-08 ﬁnancial crisis, institutes a wide array of
new regulations for the ﬁnancial services industry.
23associated with asset s. The policy imposes that the asset kept in retention is the exact same
asset as the one transferred in a match, i.e., if the asset transferred is fraudulent, so is the asset in
retention.31 The cost of producing d(s) units of fraudulent asset is of the form kf(s)+kv(s)d(s),
where the variable cost component, kv(s)d(s), was introduced to provide a channel through which
the regulatory measure can reduce agents’ incentive to commit fraud. We let kf(s) > 0 and take
kv(s) to be small enough so that, as before, equilibrium oﬀers are accepted with probability one
(see Supplementary Appendix B). The resalability constraint of asset s becomes:
kf(s)+kv(s)[1+ρ(s)]d(s) ≥ [φ(s) − β][1+ρ(s)]d(s)+βσd(s). (22)
The left side of (22) is the cost of fraud on d(s) units of asset s.I fkv(s) > 0, then policy increases
the cost of fraud and, therefore, reduces fraud incentives. The right side of (22) is the cost of holding
[1 + ρ(s)]d(s) genuine units of asset s. Thus, if the asset is liquid or partially liquid, φ(s) − β>0,
the retention requirement generates a distortion by increasing the eﬀective holding cost of the asset.
In Supplementary Appendix B, we solve for equilibrium following the same steps as before. We
show that a retention requirement has asymmetric eﬀects on the resalability of an asset, depending





It is an increasing function of ρ(s) because when φ(s)=β retention rates raise the cost of com-






which is a decreasing function of ρ(s). Thus, for liquid or partially liquid assets, the distortionary
eﬀect of retention rates dominates the incentive eﬀect, reducing velocity and welfare. In the case of
liquid assets, this result is straightforward since the threat of fraud is not a binding constraint. In the
case of partially liquid assets, retention requirements have the partial equilibrium eﬀect of relaxing
resalability constraints. But this eﬀect simultaneously increases the demand for partially liquid
31In the context of securitization (see Supplementary Appendix H), a retention requirement means that the
securitizer (represented in the model by the buyer) needs to retain assets from the same issue of asset-based securities
he is oﬀering to the general public (represented in the model by the seller).
24assets. Therefore, for asset markets to clear, the prices of partially liquid assets must increase,
tightening back the resalability constraints and eliminating the positive incentive eﬀect of the
retention policy. Taken together, the above results suggest that retention requirements should target
illiquid assets. Other, more recognizable assets, should be exempted, in line with the prescriptions
of the Dodd Frank Act.
5.3 Dynamics of liquidity premia
This section provides a dynamic extension of our static model. We show that the prices of all
liquid assets covary with a common liquidity premium.32 This common liquidity premium can be
the subject of self-fulﬁlling ﬂuctuations, creating excess volatility in the price of liquid assets. The
prices of illiquid and partially liquid assets are, however, immune to such ﬂuctuations.
Given agents’ quasilinear preferences, it is straightforward to introduce an inﬁnite time horizon
using the setup of Lagos and Wright (2005). Time is indexed by t ∈ N. Each period is divided into
two subperiods, a DM followed by a CM. Each unit of the asset s pays oﬀ a dividend normalized
to one unit of the num´ eraire at the beginning of each CM. The technology to produce fraudulent
assets in period t − 1 becomes obsolete in period t, and all fraudulent assets produced in period t
are conﬁscated by the government before agents enter the CM of period t.33
As shown in supplementary Appendix D, these assumptions allow us to apply the analysis of
the static model, where the terminal value of the asset is equal to the cum-dividend value, 1+φt(s),
of reselling the asset in the CM in period t. Focusing on equilibrium with qt <q ∗, Proposition 2





β + ξt κt(s) ≥ ¯ κt
β +[ κt(s) − βσ]i fκt(s) ∈ (κ, ¯ κt)
βκ t(s) ≤ κ
, (25)
32References on the empirical literature on the co-movements of liquidity across assets are included in Acharya
and Pedersen (2005) who develop an asset pricing model in which a per-share cost of selling securities can vary over
time.
33This assumption, borrowed from Nosal and Wallace (2007), is made for tractability to prevent fraudulent assets
from circulating across periods.
34If aggregate liquidity is abundant, there exists a unique equilibrium in which the resalability constraint and
the feasibility constraint do not bind at any date, qt = q










qt = L =
￿
s∈S







The equilibrium equations are the same as in the static model, but with an endogenous terminal
value of 1 + φt(s). This diﬀerence is substantial because expectations of future liquidity premia,
capitalized in φt(s), feed back into the current liquidity premium, φt−1(s) − β [1 + φt(s)].35
We now characterize equilibria in a neighborhood of the unique steady state,
￿
{¯ φ(s)}, ¯ q,¯ ξ
￿
.I n
such a neighborhood, the sets of liquid, partially liquid, and illiquid assets do not change. Moreover,
from (25), one can verify that
dφt−1(s)
dφt(s) ∈ [0,1) for all κt(s) < ¯ κt, so that the prices of illiquid and
partially liquid assets are equal to their steady-state values in any dynamic equilibrium. This need
not be the case for liquid assets. To see this point, let us linearize the equilibrium equations near
the steady state. We obtain, from (25), that the price of liquid assets solves:
ˆ φt−1(s)=
￿




where ˆ φt(s) ≡ φt(s)−¯ φ(s) and ˆ ξt ≡ ξt−¯ ξ. The ﬁrst term on the right side of (28) is the discounted
value of the future price of the asset, with the discount rate augmented by a liquidity premium;
the second term captures the change in the liquidity premium. Linearizing (26) and (27) in the
neighborhood of the steady state:




and ˆ qt ≡ qt − ¯ q. From (29), the size of the liquidity premium, relative to its steady-state value,
depends negatively on changes in the market capitalization of liquid assets.
Multiplying both sides of (28) by A(s) and taking the sum over all liquid assets, we obtain






35This eﬀect, as is well known, can lead to an equilibrium in which an asset has positive value even if it pays no
dividend; i.e., a positive liquidity premium can be a self-fulﬁlling phenomenon. In Supplementary Appendix D we
consider such an economy with ﬁat money.
26The nature of the dynamics depends on γ.I f γ>−1, then ˆ ξt = ¯ ξ for all t, and the liquidity
premium is constant over time. If γ<−1, in contrast, there exists a continuum of equilibria
indexed by the initial value of ˆ ξ in the neighborhood of zero that converges to the steady state.
Along these equilibria, ˆ ξt alternates between positive and negative values. The price of liquid assets
covaries and exhibits excessive volatility relative to fundamentals, whereas the prices of partially
liquid assets and illiquid ones remain constant. As can be seen from (29), the ﬂuctuating liquidity
premium is a self-fulﬁlling phenomenon. If agents anticipate that the liquidity premium will be
high in the future so that ˆ φt > 0, then aggregate liquidity and output are high, ˆ qt > 0. But, at
the margin, agents do not value much the asset’s liquidity services, and so the current liquidity
premium is low, ˆ ξt < 0. If the constant multiplying ˆ ξt in (28) is large enough, then ˆ φt−1 < 0. The
same reasoning implies that the liquidity premium one period before will be high, ˆ ξt−1 > 0, and
the ﬂuctuations will continue.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a theory of the cross-sectional distribution and time-variation of
liquidity premia by taking seriously the possibility of asset fraud in an economy with limited com-
mitment and enforcement. We have shown the emergence of asset-speciﬁc resalability constraints
that take the form of upper bounds on the transfer of assets in OTC market trades. These bounds
are not invariant to policy shifts (e.g., the composition of asset supplies and regulation on assets’
retention requirements), and they depend on some characteristics of the assets such as their vulner-
ability to fraud, as well as the frequency of trading opportunities. Our model generates a liquidity
structure of asset returns based on a three-tier classiﬁcation of assets. This classiﬁcation is rele-
vant for the comparative statics of asset prices, the dynamics of liquidity premia, explanations of
ﬂight-to-liquidity phenomena, and the analysis of open-market operations and regulations of the
OTC market.
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31AP r o o f o f P r o p o s i t i o n 1
We deﬁne an outcome of the game as an oﬀer (q,{d(s)}) made by the buyer, probabilities {η(s)} of
bringing genuine assets, and a probability π ∈ [0,1] that the seller accepts the oﬀer. Let us consider















subject to the constraint that the probabilities π and {η(s)} are the basis of an equilibrium in the
sub-game following oﬀer (q,{d(s)}); that is:














k(s) − [φ(s) − β + βσπ]d(s)
￿
, for all s ∈ S. (33)
We start by showing that:
Claim 1 Any solution of the auxiliary problem has the property that η(s)=1and q =
￿
s∈S d(s).
Proof. Consider ﬁrst any feasible outcome ￿q,d,η,π￿ such that η(s0) < 1 for some s0.I f
η(s0) = 0, then consider the alternative outcome, ￿q￿,d ￿,η￿,π￿￿, such that: (i) q￿ = q, d￿(s)=d(s)
for all s ￿= s0, d￿(s0) = 0; (ii) η￿(s)=η(s) for all s ￿= s0 and η￿(s0) = 1; (iii) π￿ = π.T h e
incentive constraint of the seller, (32), is satisﬁed since it only depends on the product η(s)d(s).
The incentive constraint of the buyer, (33), is obviously satisﬁed for s ￿= s0. For s = s0 we have
k(s0) > [φ(s) − β + βσ]d￿(s0) = 0 and so η￿(s0) = 1 is optimal for the buyer. One can then verify
that, with this alternative outcome, the expected utility of the buyer increases by k(s0) > 0.
Next, consider any feasible outcome such that η(s0) ∈ (0,1): the buyer is indiﬀerent between
counterfeiting asset s0 or not. We then increase η(s0)b yε ∈ (0,1] and q by εd(s0), which is positive
since the incentive constraint of the buyer, (33), binds. The incentive constraint of the seller, (32)
is satisﬁed because his payoﬀ conditional on accepting the oﬀer does not change. Because the buyer
is indiﬀerent between counterfeiting asset s0 or not, an increase in η(s0) aﬀects neither his payoﬀ,
(31), nor his incentive constraint, (33). The corresponding increase in q, however, increases his
payoﬀ strictly.
32Next, consider any feasible outcome ￿q,d,η,π￿ such that η(s) = 1 for all s, but q<
￿
s∈S d(s).
Then the alternative outcome with q￿ =
￿
s∈S >q , η￿(s) = 1, and π￿ = π, increases the expected
payoﬀ to the buyer by σβπ[u(q￿) − u(q)] > 0 and satisﬁes all the constraints.










d(s) − q = 0 (35)
k(s) ≥ [φ(s) − β + βσπ)]d(s), for all s ∈ S. (36)
The second condition is the ﬁrst-order necessary and suﬃcient condition for (33) evaluated at
η(s) = 1. Next, we show:
Claim 2 Any solution of the auxiliary problem, (31)-(33), has the property that u￿(q) ≥ 1 and
π =1 .
Proof. The ﬁrst claim holds because otherwise one could reduce the quantity produced, increase
the expected utility of the buyer, and satisfy all the constraints. To prove the second claim suppose,
towards a contradiction, that π<1. Note ﬁrst that the value of the auxiliary problem must be
positive: a small oﬀer q￿ = d￿(s0) > 0, d￿(s) = 0 for s ￿= s0, and π￿ = 1 yields a positive payoﬀ.
This implies that both q>0 and π>0. Moreover, at least one of the incentive constraints,
(36), must be binding since otherwise one could increase π without violating any of the incentive
constraints, and improve the objective. Let SB ⊆ S be the set of binding IC constraints. Since
[φ(s) − β + βσπ]d(s)=k(s) for all s ∈ SB, it follows that d(s) > 0. Now consider the following
variational experiment: increase π by some small ε and decrease the payments d(s), for all s ∈ SB,
so that all the incentive constraints continue to bind. Up to second-order terms, the decrease in
d(s) is equal to m(s)ε,w h e r e
m(s) ≡
βσd(s)
φ(s) − β + βσπ
,
is the marginal rate of substitution between π and d(s) in the IC constraint for asset s ∈ SB.
Lastly, to satisfy the participation constraint, the decrease in q must be, up to second order terms,
33￿
s∈SB m(s)ε. The change in the buyer’s expected utility is, up to second-order terms, equal to
































[d(s) − πm(s)] =
￿
s∈SB
[φ(s) − β]m(s)u￿(q) ≥ 0,
where we move from the ﬁrst line to the second line using u(q)−q>q[u￿(q) − 1] ≥ 0 (the equality
is strict because of two facts: ﬁrst, u(q) is strictly concave and second, q>0, since the value of
the auxiliary problem is positive); from the second line to the third line using q ≥
￿
s∈SB d(s); and
from the third to the fourth line by noting that d(s) − πm(s)=[ φ(s) − β]m(s)/(βσ).
From Claims 1-2 and the result according to which a(s) ≥ χ(s)d(s)i fφ(s)=β, and a(s)=
χ(s)d(s)i fφ(s) >β , it follows that the auxiliary problem, (31)-(33), reduces to the maximization
problem of Proposition 1, (8)-(11). Now we note that the solution to the auxiliary problem is an
upper bound on the value of the buyer in any equilibrium of the game. Let (˜ q,{˜ d(s)}) be one
solution of the auxiliary problem. Because, as argued above, the value of the auxiliary problem
is positive, it must satisfy ˜ q>0 and ˜ d(s) > 0 for some s ∈ S. Consider, for any ε>0 small
enough, the oﬀer dε(s) = max{˜ d(s)−ε,0} and qε =˜ q−(S +1)ε. By construction, this oﬀer is such
that [φ(s) − β + βσ]dε(s) <k (s), and qε <
￿
s∈S dε(s). Thus, π = 1 and η(s)=1i st h eu n i q u e
equilibrium in the subgame following (qε,{dε(s)}). By letting ε go to zero and making the above
oﬀer, the buyer can achieve a value arbitrarily close to that of the auxiliary problem. Therefore, in
any equilibrium, the buyer’s value must be equal to that of the auxiliary problem. Moreover, any
equilibrium outcome satisﬁes (32) and (33). Therefore, any equilibrium outcome must solve the
auxiliary problem.
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